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This study analyses the impact of service deregulation on industry growth, to observe
if industries that use less regulated services more intensively experience faster value added
growth rates. Considering a sample of 18 OECD countries between two periods of time. The
analysis focuses on the regulation of telecommunications, energy, transports and professional
services. Results indicate that deregulating services increases industry growth in downstream
manufacturing industries. Moreover, I have identified threshold effects, after some level of
deregulation the regulations seem not to matter. Preliminary results indicate that foreign
service dependence is the most important. Estimates are robust to accounting for different
measures of financial development.
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Policy makers tend to think that countries with less regulated services perform better economi-
cally than countries with highly regulated services. This view is supported by a large range of
literature examining the effects of entry barriers on economic growth, (Klapper et al. (2006),
Jerbashian and Kochanova (2016)). An inadequate service infrastructure, such as poor telecom-
munications, transport networks, energy or a week financial system are perceived as critical
bottlenecks on sustainable development.
Regulation which creates entry barriers and vertical integration is known to hamper growth in
services, which are an important part of the economy and comprise a large share in intermediate
inputs and value added, Bena et al. (2011) show that in 1970 services accounted for 26% of
intermediate production and 39% of value added, whereas in 2007 they represented 36% and
50% respectively. Since the implementation of the European Single Market Program, services
can move freely across intra-EU borders, among OECD countries, the service sector has become
one of the most important providers of both output and jobs, and the adequate provision of
services is highly recognised as one of the preconditions for development. Because of that, it
might have non-negligible effects over industry growth, specifically in those industries that use
regulated services more intensively.
I analyse the effects of services deregulation on economic growth, testing whether countries
which have more liberalized services, experience higher growth in downstream manufacturing
industries. I specifically test the effects of services regulation, by using data from 18 OECD
countries and examining if countries with less regulation appear to have better economic perfor-
mance in downstream manufacturing industries that use less regulated services more intensively,
between 1999 and 2007.
This paper is directly related with the paper of Barone and Cingano (2011), it borrows
their methodology, extending their sample and analysis. In particular I use OECD and WIOD
(World Input-Output Database) databases to construct a similar dataset but extended to cover
the period 1999-2007, and adding three more OECD countries. This allows me to observe if there
are threshold effects in the light of a lot of service deregulation. Moreover, I also consider foreign
services dependence and regulations. I start with replicating the results of Barone and Cingano
(2011) by replicating their data from different databases in order to check for the robustness
of their results, with the purpose of extending the study. Their main finding is that service
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regulation has a negative and significant impact on industry growth, exports and productivity
on industries that are more service dependent than less. I extend the analysis of Barone and
Cingano (2011) by considering a longer period of time, between 1996 and 2007, in order to observe
how changes in regulation affect industry growth. Because of the increased international trade in
services, I use alternative measures of service dependence which consider the service dependence
each country has from other countries. In order to measure service dependence across industries,
I use input-output matrices, whereas service regulation comprises OECD indicators designed to
capture regulatory settings for the energy sector, the telecommunication and the transportation
sectors and for professional services.
I find that results for 1996-2002 are in line with Barone and Cingano (2011), lower service
regulation increases value added in downstream service intensive industries. Although when I
extend the sample, I found that results for 1999-2007 are different, after dropping countries and
industries it seems that there is a service deregulation threshold. Finally I use WIOD database
which allows to consider foreign service dependence and regulation 1, although it is a preliminary
result, it appears to be the most important.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the related literature. A
description of the variables used in the paper can be found in Section 3. Section 4 presents the
methodology used in this study regarding the construction of a measure calculating the level of
service dependence. Results and regressions are shown in Section 5. Finally, section 6 presents
the conclusions.
2 Previous literature
The analysis of the effects of service deregulation on economic growth have been largely studied.
Kremers and Koedijk (1996) reviewed the deregulation trails in continental Europe focusing on
the political preconditions for successful deregulation. Authors found a negative relationship
among the level of regulation and the economic performance. It characterized European coun-
tries by the degree of regulation of labor and product markets, and find that the latter seems to
be more important for economic performance.
One of the main robustness checks in the paper consists in accounting for the link between
finance and industry growth, countries with better developed financial markets and less financial
1Foreign regulation is a research in progress which I together with my supervisor, Prof. Vahagn Jerbashian
will develop in the future.
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dependent industries experience higher growth rates than industries which are high financially
dependent. Because of that, growth effects of service regulation can be comparable to those of
finance development. Rajan and Zingales (1998) studied weather industrial sectors that were
relatively more in need of external finance, developed disproportionally faster in countries with
more developed financial markets. Their findings highlight the relevance of financial development
as one relevant model for international specialization.
A restrictive product market regulation environment diminishes the process of adjustment
through which positive productivity shocks diffuse across borders and new technologies are
incorporated into the production process. Conway et al. (2006) show that in some of the most
restrictive OECD countries the loss of adaptability that occurs as a result of sharp levels of
regulation can be very high. Conway and Nicoletti (2007) studied the particular case of one non
OECD country, Canada, and found that if there are remaining regulatory barriers to competition
in a few key non-manufacturing sectors, this may have prevented the economy from highly
benefiting from high productivity growth rates. Indicators of service regulation used in the study
account for entry barriers in energy, telecommunications, transport and professional services,
among others. Klapper et al. (2006) show that entry barriers hamper entry and entrepreneurship,
especially in industries that naturally should have high entry. Investments in information and
communication technologies (ICT) signicantly contribute to economic growth and development,
according to recent empirical evidence, Jerbashian and Kochanova (2016) show that investments
in ICT are lower, in industries that depend more on ICT, in countries where greater regulations
are required for starting a business and for registering property.
Service liberalization has been recently analyzed in the context of productivity as it further
affects within-firm productivity growth. Bena et al. (2011) show that as a response to the
removal of regulatory barriers hampering entry and reducing state ownership, network services
firms accomplished on average 5.5% productivity gains over a period of four years. Boylaud and
Nicoletti (2000) use an international database on regulation, market structure and performance
in the telecommunication industry to analyze how liberalization affected productivity, price and
quality of the service. Authors found that potential competition leads to productivity and
quality improvements as well as a reduction of the telecommunication prices. Using panel data,
and controlling for differences in economic structure and technology developments.
Fonseca and Utero (2005) account for alternative forms of regulation, authors demonstrate
that the strictness of product and labor market regulations have effects on firm growth, specif-
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ically, the stricter the rules the more detrimental is the influence on growth in sectorial value
added. Foster et al. (2005) investigate the role of labor market regulations in influencing labor
reallocation and the capacity of adaptability of firms to technological shocks. Furthermore, reg-
ulatory reforms that have decreased the level of economic rents appear to be associated with
lower levels of labor and total factor productivity growth.
Using a more detailed data sample has proved to be more efficient for the empirical analysis
on the influence that policy regulation exerts over growth, because of that Inklaar et al. (2008)
use industry-level measures of output, inputs, and multifactor productivity (MFP) from the EU
KLEMS database, finding evidence that service liberalization has been beneficial for productivity
growth in telecommunications. Bourlès et al. (2013) also use a model of multifactor productivity
(MFP) growth and panel data from fifteen OECD countries, to check the influence of upstream
competition on productivity outcomes in downstream industries and find that anticompetitive
upstream regulations have significantly constrained MFP growth over the past fifteen years.
They show that the effects are stronger for those observations that are close to their productivity
frontier. In the same line, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) work with a large new dataset on
product market regulation containing industry-level data, in order to test whether industries
closer to their technological frontier grow faster in more liberalized markets.
A growing body of research indicates that despite the existence of certain convergence in
policy conditions, there are still major disparities in the business environment in the OECD
countries, which continue affecting incentives to innovate and adopt new technologies. Nicoletti
et al. (2008) reviewed productivity growth patterns across OECD countries over the past fifteen
years with the use of sectorial and firm-level data. Authors found that solid regulation of
services, especially in continental EU counties, has reduced growth in ICT-using sectors, which
used intermediate service inputs intensively. Accounting for the difficulties of the allocation of
resources towards the most efficient and dynamic firms, as one of the main channels through
which regulation affected productivity.
3 Methodology
I use Barone and Cingano (2011) index of exposure of downstream industries to service regula-
tion, BCSERV REGi,c, which is the main explanatory variable of their study. In order to test
each industry dependence on each service regulation, for all countries between 1996 and 2002.
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The index is measured combining country-level information on service regulation and industry-






Where Xc,s is an index of service regulation for country c and sector s, on a scale from 0 to 6,
where 6 represent the stricter conditions. I have obtained the data from OECD PMR (Product
Market Regulation) database. Moreover, wi,s is a measure of industry i dependence on regulated
services s, calculated as the share of expenditures on services out of the value of industry output.
I have obtained the data from input-output accounts. The first part of the study consists in
analysing the effects of anti-competitive service regulation over industry growth, replicating the
data from the different databases and performing Barone and Cingano (2011) exercise.
For the purpose of replication, in this first part wi,s is calculated using US input-output
matrix which are assumed to reflect technological differences rather than country specific deter-
minants. For this reason, I use 1997 US input-output matrix (excluding United States from the
sample) and data on service regulation from OECD PMR database in 1996 for energy, transport
and telecommunication and 1998 for professional services. (Data on professional services only
available for 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013).
In the second part of the study I conduct a robustness check that consists in changing the
time period, between 1999 and 2007, to observe if the effects of service regulation have changed
over time in the face of strong services deregulation. Working with the average US input-
output matrix between 1999 and 2007 with the purpose of obtaining a most accurate measure
of industry dependence on services. Moreover, policy regulation data is obtained from OECD






Furthermore, the last part of the study, consists in changing the industry dependence on
service regulation between 1996 and 2002, but leaving constant all the other variables from this
period. Instead of using input-output service dependence from a benchmark country (US) I
use each country specific service dependence. I have obtained the data from the World Input-
Output database (WIOD) and data on each country specific service regulation is obtained form
5
the OECD PMR database. Service dependence is calculated as the share of expenditures on
services out of the value of industry output using the average input-output accounts between
1996-2002. Data on policy variables is obtained from OECD PRM, from 1996 except from






Where Xc,s is an index of service regulation for country c and sector s, on a scale from 0 to
6, where 6 represent the stricter conditions. Moreover, gi,s is a measure of industry i dependence
on regulated services s.
Because of the increased international trade in manufacturing and offshoring of services, the
regulation of foreign services might also be important for the growth of domestic manufacturing
industries. The purpose of the last part of the study, is to test if external service dependence has
effects on internal value added growth of downstream manufacturing industries, by taking into
account service interrelationships among countries. Data on industry dependence on services is
obtained from the World Input-Output database (WIOD). The period of interest is as in Barone
and Cingano (2011), 1996-2002. Service dependence is computed using the average between the
seven years of world input-output matrices. Finally, policy variables are from 1996 except from
professional services which is from 1998 (obtained from OECD PMR). Foreign service regulation
index is calculated as follows:






Where wi,c,sc′ corresponds to the dependence on industry i in country c on services-in-country
c’ (e.g Austria uses service from its own country and from other countries such as Belgium).
Finally, Xc,sc′ corresponds to service regulation in country c and service regulation in country
c’.
At last but not least, important robustness checks for the analysis consists in taking into
account the relationship between finance and industry growth as financially dependent indus-
tries experience faster value added growth than industries which depend less, in countries with
better developed financial markets, Rajan and Zingales (1998). I adopt two different measures
of industry financial development; private credit by deposit money banks over GDP and ac-
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counting standards. Moreover, another robustness check consists in introducing the average
SERV REGi,c between the sample period. Furthermore, the study also accounts for the differ-
ences in regulation between 1996 and 2002, for the first and last part of the study, and between
1999-2007 for the second part, in order to give robustness to the results.
4 Data Sample
The major part of the data is obtained from the OECD database, specifically from the Structural
Analysis Dataset (STAN), which provides a comprehensive tool for analyzing industrial perfor-
mance at a relatively detailed level of activity across countries. It includes annual measures
of output, labor input, investment, and international trade. It is primarily based on member
countries’ annual national accounts complementing them from other sources, such as national
industry surveys/census. The data is classified according to International Standard Industrial
Classification Revision 3 (ISIC Rev. 3) of all economic activities (including services).
In order to measure the level of dependence of manufacturing industries on service regulation
the combination of both country-level information on service regulation and industry-level data
on service dependence is needed. The OECD’s Product Market Regulation (PMR), (Conway
and Nicoletti (2006)) indicators provide a broad coverage of product market regulation indexes
at the economy-wide level in the following broad regulatory domains: state control, barriers
to entrepreneurship, and barriers to international trade and investment. The study focuses
on four upstream main types of services; energy, telecommunications, professional services and
transport.
Furthermore, I obtain data on input-output tables from two different databases OECD
(OECD input-output database) and WIOD (World Input-Output database) in order to have
two different measures of industry dependence on services. As explained in the methodology, on
one hand I use US input-output matrix, whereas on the other hand I use each country input-
output matrix. Finally I analyse two different periods of time for the whole sample, the first
period comprises form 1996 to 2002 (following Barone and Cingano (2011)), while the second
period ranges from 1999 to 2007. The main variables used in the empirical part are summarized
in Table 1 and 2, which presents the characteristics of the main variables used. (number of
observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum). A more detailed description
of variables and sources can be found in the Appendix A.1 and A.2.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the main variables, 1996-2002
Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
Country-industry level
Real value added growth 1996-2002 [GROWTHi,c] 342 0.018 0.051 -0.304 0.241
Nominal value added growth 1996-2002 [NGROWTHi,c] 390 0.036 0.051 -0.283 0.198
Implicit deflator growth 1996-2002 [DEFGROWTHi,c] 342 0.166 0.044 -0.304 0.214
Value added share in 1996 [SHAREi,c] 392 0.739 0.541 0.000 0.461
Service regulation in 1996 [SERVREGi,c] 308 0.275 0.006 0.078 0.600
Change in service regulation 1996-2002 [DSERVREGi,c] 308 0.068 0.394 -0.010 0.187
Industry level
Dependence on energy 1996-2002 [Wenergyi,s] 420 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.190
Dependence on telecommunications 1996-2002 [Wtelecommunicationsi,s] 420 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.010
Dependence on transports 1996-2002 [Wtransporti,s] 420 0.239 0.010 0.117 0.431
Dependence on professional services 1996-2002 [Wprof.serv.i,s] 420 0.485 0.188 0.009 0.893
External finance dependence 1996 [EDi,s] 420 0.735 1.588 -0.45 6.200
Country level
Regulation of energy in 1996 [Energyc,s] 392 5.057 1.013 2.489 6.000
Regulation of telecommunications in 1996 [Telecommunicationsc,s] 392 3.500 1.622 0.000 6.000
Regulation of transport in 1996 [Transportc,s] 392 3.941 0.989 1.125 6.000
Regulation of professional services in 1996 [Professional serviesc,s] 322 2.437 1.133 0.494 4.354
Financial development in 1996 [FDc] 406 0.672 0.357 0.165 1.724
Notes: Summary statistics of the most important variables used int the paper.
In brackets, the name of the variables used in the database.
All variables and data sources are defined in detail in the Appendix A.1 and A.2.
Table 2: Summary statistics of the main variables, 1999-2007
Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
Country-industry level
Real value added growth 1999-2007 [GRWOTHi,c] 344 0.024 0.463 -0.178 0.206
Nominal value added growth 1999-2007 [NGROWTHi,c] 395 0.471 0.807 -0.970 0.724
Implicit deflator growth 1999-2007 [DEFGROWTHi,c] 344 0.125 0.369 -0.131 0.162
Value added share in 1999 [SHAREi,c] 381 0.734 0.561 0.002 0.144
Service regulation in 1999 [SERVREGi,c] 336 0.290 0.127 0.559 0.602
Change in service regulation 1999-2007 [DSERVREGi,c] 336 0.611 0.443 -0.002 0.218
Industry level
Dependence on energy 1999-2007 [Wenergyi,s] 420 0.132 0.007 0.004 0.030
Dependence on telecommunications 1999-2007 [Wtelecom.i,s] 420 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.011
Dependence on transports 1999-2007 [Wtransporti,s] 420 0.249 0.009 0.012 0.042
Dependence on professional services 1999-2007 [Wprof.servicesi,s] 420 0.061 0.025 0.006 0.107
Country level
Regulation of energy in 1999 [Energyc,s] 392 3.486 0.851 1.937 5.750
Regulation of telecommunications in 1999 [Telecommunicationsc,s] 406 1.021 0.720 0.000 3.125
Regulation of transports in 1999 [Transportc,s] 392 3.035 0.966 1.250 5.125
Regulation of professional services in 1999 [Professional serviesc,s] 420 0.132 0.007 0.004 0.030
Financial development in 1999 [FDc] 336 0.716 0.408 0.193 1.924
Financial disclosure [ACCSTANc] 252 0.658 0.125 0.42 0.900
Notes: Summary statistics of the most important variables used int the paper.
In brackets, the name of the variables used in the database.
All variables and data sources are defined in detail in the Appendix A.1 and A.2.
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5 Results
I first compare the original and the new databases in order to check if the data of both datasets
does not differ substantially by testing for the robustness of the results. Both databases com-
prise the same variables for the same period, 1996-2002. Table 3 presents the summary statistics
(number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) and the correla-
tions between both data samples. The table is divided in three parts; country-industry level,
country level and industry level.
For the first part (country-industry level data), all the variables are highly correlated and
the standard deviations are quite similar between both databases. Moreover, the mean the
minimum and the maximum are also aligned. For the second part (country level variables),
all variables are highly correlated and the lowest correlation is for energy regulation, summary
statistics are very similar although the mean for the new dataset is a little bit larger because
the maximum is higher. In these two parts, the number of observations is higher in the new
database. Finally in the last part (industry-level), the number of observations is the same for
both samples, summary statistics are comparable and variables are highly correlated. With this
analysis I provide evidence that data of both databases is similar.
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Table 3: Summary statistics of the main variables
Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Corr.
Country-Industry level
Real value added growth 1996-2002 [GROWTHi,c] 342 0.018 0.051 -0.304 0.241 0.8094***
Real value added growth 1996-2002 [GROWTHi,c]* 307 0.024 0.060 -0.284 0.523
Nominal value added growth 1996-2002 [NGROWTHi,c] 390 0.036 0.051 -0.283 0.198 0.6614***
Nominal value added growth 1996-2002 [NGROWTHi,c]* 323 0.034 0.051 -0.199 0.439
Implicit deflator growth 1996-2002 [DEFGROWTHi,c] 342 0.166 0.044 -0.304 0.214 0.6298***
Implicit deflator growth 1996-2002 [DEFGROWTHi,c]* 300 0.009 0.044 -0.335 0.189
Value added share in 1996 [SHAREi,c] 392 0.739 0.541 0.000 0.461 0.9605***
Value added share in 1996 [SHAREi,c]* 375 0.722 0.052 0.001 0.454
Financial development [FDc] 406 0.672 0.357 0.165 1.724 0.9373***
Financial development [FDc]* 420 0.679 0.331 0.168 1.633
External finance dependence 1996 [EDc] 420 0.735 1.588 -0.450 6.200 0.9996***
External finance dependence 1996 [EDc]* 420 0.733 1.590 -0.450 6.200
Financial disclosure[ACCSTANc] 252 0.658 0.125 0.420 0.900 1.0000***
Financial disclosure[ACCSTANc]* 252 0.658 0.125 0.420 0.900
Service regulation in 1996 [SERVREGi,c] 308 0.275 0.006 0.078 0.600 0.7836***
Service regulation in 1996 [SERVREGi,c]* 308 0.240 0.103 0.069 0.627
Average service regulation 1996-2002 [AVGSERVREGi,c] 378 0.242 0.085 0.081 0.524 0.7855***
Average service regulation 1996-2002 [AVGSERVREGi,c]* 308 0.203 0.089 0.654 0.580
Change in service regulation 1996-2002 [DSERVREGi,c] 308 0.068 0.394 -0.010 0.187 0.6848***
Change in service regulation 1996-2002 [DSERVREGi,c]* 308 0.078 0.049 0.001 0.290
Country level
Regulation in energy in 1996 [Energyc,s] 392 5.057 1.013 2.489 6.000 0.7323***
Regulation in energy in 1996* [Energyc,s] 308 4.300 1.295 1.808 6.000
Regulation in telecommunications in 1996 [Telecommunicationsc,s] 392 3.500 1.622 0.000 6.000 0.8973***
Regulation in telecommunications in 1996* [Telecommunicationsc,s] 308 2.899 1.534 0.100 5.679
Regulation in transports in 1996 [Transportc,s] 392 3.941 0.989 1.125 6.000 0.8859***
Regulation in transports in 1996* [Transportc,s] 308 2.861 0.927 1.529 5.133
Regulation in professional services in 1996 [Professional Servicesc,s] 322 2.437 1.133 0.494 4.354 0.9286***
Regulation in professional services in 1996* [Professional Servicesc,s] 336 2.458 1.041 0.829 4.178
Industry level
Dependence on energy 1996-2002 [Wenergyi,s] 420 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.190 0.8449***
Dependence on energy 1996-2002* [Wenergyi,s] 420 0.017 0.009 0.006 0.038
Dependence on telecommunications 1996-2002 [Wtelecommunicationsi,s] 420 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.7882***
Dependence on telecommunications 1996-2002* [Wtelecommunicationsi,s] 420 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.006
Dependence on transports 1996-2002 [Wtransporti,s] 420 0.239 0.010 0.117 0.431 0.7791***
Dependence on transports 1996-2002* [Wtransporti,s] 420 0.030 0.136 0.011 0.063
Dependence on professional services 1996-2002 [Wprof.serv.i,s] 420 0.485 0.188 0.009 0.893 0.5886***
Dependence on professional services 1996-2002*[Wprof.serv.i,s] 420 0.267 0.010 0.013 0.054
Notes: * Variables from Barone and Cingano (2011).
In brackets, the name of the variables used in the database.
All variables and data sources are defined in detail in the Appendix A.1 and A.2.
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5.1 Service Regulation, Growth and Price effects between 1996-2002
Following Barone and Cingano (2011), the value added growth regression between 1996 and
2002 is the following:
GROWTHi,c = α+ βSERV REGi,c + δSHAREi,c + µi + γc + εi,c
Where GROWTHi,c represents the real value added growth in each country c and industry i
between 1996-2002, SHAREi,c is the sample initial period value added industry share in industry
i and country c in 1996, in order to control for more specialized industries. Service regulation,
SERV REGi,c, captures the level of exposure of downstream manufacturing industries to service
regulation between 1996 and 2002. Moreover, µi and γc are country and industry specific effects
respectively, to deal with reverse causation or omitted variables. Finally, β measures the effects
of service regulation on industry growth, there is a negative link between regulation and growth
if β is negative.
5.1.1 Regulation and Output growth
Coefficient reported in Table 4, column 1, presents industry dependence on service sector regula-
tion as baseline direct weights that represent technical coefficients of dependence between service
sector s and manufacturing industry i computed on the US input-output matrix. It shows the
negative relationship between service regulation and industry growth, the more regulated the
lower growth rate. Column 2 and 3 are means of robustness accounting for the relationship be-
tween finance development and industry growth, as financial development facilitates economic
growth; high financially dependent industries experience faster value added growth rates than
less dependent industries, Rajan and Zingales (1998). Financial development is calculated as
private credit by deposit money banks over GDP in 1996 in column 2 and as accounting stan-
dards in column 3, with US industry external finance dependence as the interaction term. Both
measures are positive and significant, neither of the calculations affects the negative link between
service regulation and economic growth. This findings leads to the same conclusions as Barone
and Cingano (2011) results, decreasing beginning of period anti-competitive regulation in the
provision of services has a significant and positive effect on industry growth.
Column 4 presents the average service regulation between 1996 and 2002, using service
regulation from 1996, the results are in line with Barone and Cingano (2011), where an increase
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in service regulation leads to a decrease in industry growth. Finally the last column accounts
for the deregulation between 1996 and 2002, to observe how changes in service regulation affects
economic growth (e.g. countries with high levels of service regulation in the beginning of the
period, which experimented process of deregulation that effects value added), the results show
the strongest effects in this case.
Table 4: Services Regulation and Growth, 1996-2002















Service regulation [SERV REGi,c] -0.195
∗∗ -0.193∗∗ -0.181∗ -0.159∗∗ -0.219∗∗
(0.097) (0.095) (0.099) (0.080) (0.099)
Financial dev. x external dep. [FDc x EDc] 0.004
∗ 0.004 0.005 ∗ 0.004 ∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Accounting stand. x external dep [ACCSTANc x EDc] 0.014
∗∗
(0.006)
Change in service regulation [DSERV REGi,c] 0.212
∗
(0.116)
Initial industry share [SHAREı́,c] 0.073 0.058 0.073 0.054 0.059
(0.052) (0.049) (0.0 53) (0.050) (0.049)
Constant 0.046 0.048 0.016 0.073 0.051
(0.032) (0.031) (0.022) (0.030) (0.031)
Observations 240 240 214 240 240
R2 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.67
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate of real value added at country-industry level [GROWTHi,c].
Financial development is calculated as private credit by deposit money banks over GDP in 1996 [FDc] in column 3
and as accounting standards in 1983 [ACCSTANc] in column 4. Service regulation is measured in 1996 except for
column 5 that is the average value. DSERV REGi,c measures exposure to service deregulation, the change in
regulation between 1996 and 2002.
For getting a sense of the size of this effect, percentiles take into account the annual growth
differential between and industry with overall service dependence at the 75th percentile (other
non-metallic mineral products) in comparison with an industry at the 25th percentile (wood and
products of wood and cork). Industries at the highest and lowest percentile are different from
the ones reported by Barone and Cingano (2011), in their data the industry with overall service
dependence at the 75th percentile is pulp, paper and printing, whereas at the 25th is fabricated
metal products.
The coefficient estimated in column 1 implies this differential would rise by approximately
0.70 percentage points if regulation were to be consistently lowered in the four services (energy,
telecommunication, transports and professional services) by an amount equal to the difference
in average between a country at the 75th and a country at the 25th. The coefficient estimated
in column 3, implies the growth differential between an industry at the 75th percentile and one
at the 25th percentile of external finance dependence (plastic products and pulp and paper,
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respectively) would increase by approximately 0.4 percentage points moving from a country
with private credit at the 25th percentile to a country close to the 75th percentile of financial
development.
5.1.2 Financial Development, Prices and Nominal Growth
In this section I investigate, in the same way as Barone and Cingano (2011), the relationship
between output and prices. As shown in the previous section, lower regulation appears to
increase output in industries which are service intensive, by decreasing the service component
of the cost of production. Because of that, there are two different effects over nominal value
added. On one hand, a positive effect as a consequence of higher output, and on the other hand
a negative effect due to lower prices.
DEFGROWTHi,c = α+ βSERV REGi,c + δSHAREi,c + µi + γc + εi,c
NGROWTHi,c = α+ βSERV REGi,c + δSHAREi,c + µi + γc + εi,c
Where DEFGROWTHi,c is the annual compounded growth rate of value added implicit
deflator for industry i and country c, whereas NGROWTHi,c is the annual compounded growth
rate of nominal value added growth for industry i and country c. Table 4 reports the results for
this relationship, from columns 1-2 the dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate
of value added implicit deflator (DEFGROWTH) between 1996-2002, whereas in columns 3-5 the
dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate of nominal value added (NGROWTH)
for the 1996-2002 period.
Table 5 estimates the effects of regulation on industry prices; higher deregulation and higher
financial development translates into lower prices in manufacturing industries which are service
intensive, which can be observed in columns 1-2. Columns 3-5 replicates the same regression as
in Table 4 using nominal value added growth rate as dependent variable, the effect of service
regulation becomes largely insignificant, as the nominal growth is an interaction between real
value added growth and prices, the negative effects of service regulation over real value added
growth rates compensates with the positive relationship between higher service regulation and
prices. This results agree with the theoretical background of Barone and Cingano (2011) who
showed that nominal growth would react less than real growth, because lower regulation increases
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output in service-intensive industries lowering the service component of the cost of production,
as a result there are two opposite effects on nominal value added: a positive effect due to higher
output and a negative effect due to lower prices. The combination of both effects might tend
to weaken the relation between service and industry output when this is measured in nominal
terms.
Table 5: Financial development, Prices and Nominal Growth 1996-2002










Service regulation [SERV REGi,c] 0.358
∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.021
(0.111) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052)
Financial dev. x external dep. [FDc x EDc] -0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Initial industry share [SHAREi,c] 0.014 0.011 0.008
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
Constant 0.010 ∗∗∗ 0.011 ∗∗∗ -0.034 ∗∗ 0.033 ∗∗∗ 0.038 ∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.162) (0.013) (0.016)
Observations 237 237 256 256 256
R2 0.61 0.61 0.70 0.71 0.71
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
In columns 1-2 the dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate of value added implicit deflator
[DEFGROWTHi,c] at industry-country level. In columns 3-5 the dependent variable is the annual compounded
growth rate of nominal value added at industry-country [NGROWTHi,c].
Columns 1-2 measures prices and columns 4-6 measures nominal value added growth.
Financial development is calculated as private credit by deposit money banks over GDP in 1996 [FDc] and
as accounting standards in 1983 [ACCSTANc]. Service regulation is measured in 1996.DSERV REGi,c
measures exposure to service deregulation, the change in regulation between 1996 and 2002.
5.2 Service Regulation, Growth and Price Effects for 1999-2007
In this section, I perform the same analysis as in the previous section but between 1999 and
2007, as means of robustness to observe if there are some changes in service regulation that can
affect countries economic performance, due to the fact that considering almost ten years there
is scope for countries to change their service regulations, moreover in this period there has been
a large change in service regulation. Countries having strict regulations in 1999 but lowering
them in the course of the years might affect industry growth. The regression is the same as in
the previous analysis:
GROWTHi,c = α+ βSERV REGi,c + δSHAREi,c + µi + γj + εi,c
Table 6 reports the results for the previous regression, where the dependent variable is
the annual compounded growth rate of real value added at the country-industry level for the
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period 1999-2007. Results are quite different from the findings in the first part of the analysis.
Coefficient reported in Table 6 column 1, presents technical coefficients of dependence between
service sector s and manufacturing industry i, computed using the US input-output matrix.
It shows that service regulation, although, having the same sign is not significant. The same
happens for column 5, which tests the change in service regulation between 1999 and 2007.
Two measures of financial development are reported in columns 3 and 4 (private credit by
deposit money bank and accounting standards respectively), to test the relationship between
finance dependence and industry growth. Both measures report different results; in column 3
service regulation is negative and significant at 10%, however, in column 4 is negative but is not
significant. Column 4 presents the average service regulation between 1999 and 2007 and the
results are different to the ones of the first part; service regulation is negative but not significant.
Finally, checking the robustness of Barone and Cingano (2011) results, I observe that they do
change during this period.
Table 6: Services Regulation and Growth, 1999-2007















Service regulation [SERV REGi,c] -0.068 -0.079* -0.010 -0.274 -0.054
(0.044) (0.045) (0.058) (0.146) (0.084)
Financial dev. x external dep. [FDc x EDc] 0.002 0.013 0.002
(0.004) (0.015) (0.004)
Accounting stand. x external dep [ACCSTANc x EDc] 0.009
(0.009)
Change in service regulation [DSERV REGi,c] -0.040
(0.130)
Initial industry share [SHAREi,c] 0.265*** 0.248*** 0.302*** 0.248***
(0.074) (0.078) (0.091) (0.079)
Constant -0.016 -0.037 -0.073** 0.069 -0.041
(0.022) (0.029) (0.033) (0.030) (0.031)
Observations 257 191 206 164 191
R2 0.69 0.73 0.64 0.61 0.73
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate of real value added at country-industry level [GROWTHi,c].
Financial development is calculated as private credit by deposit money banks over GDP in 1999 [FDc] in column 3
and as accounting standards in 1983 [ACCSTANc] in column 4. Service regulation is measured in 1999 except for
column 5 that is the average value. DSERV REGi,c measures exposure to service deregulation, the change in
regulation between 1999 and 2007.
One possible explanation for this finding is the existence of a potential threshold in pro-
fessional services; after some robustness checks constructing SERV REGi,c in different ways
(dropping each service or dropping some countries), I found that without including professional
services in the SERV REGi,c index, it becomes significant at 1%. Because of that profes-
sional service regulation has to be analyzed separately, as it has to be a change between 1998
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(professional service regulation in Table 4) and 2003 that makes service regulations become
insignificant.
In order to test for differences in professional service regulation between 1998 and 2003,
Conway and Nicoletti (2006) provide a description of different service regulation indicators
(energy, transport, telecommunications and professional services) of non-manufacturing sectors
of OECD countries over the past three decades (PMR product market regulation indicators).
In their description, differences between 1998 and 2003 are presented for professional services.
Figure 1 2, presents the list of countries from the most deregulated to the lowest for 1998 and
2003. The most important result is that the most deregulated countries in 1998 3 have stricter
regulations than in 2003. In fact, the mean of service regulation in 1998 for the most deregulated
countries was, on scale form 0-6, where 6 present the stricter conditions, 1.35 whereas five years
later in 2003 it was 1 approximately. Once excluding this ten most deregulated countries the
findings coincide with the ones found in the first part of the study. In fact, only dropping the first
five most 4 deregulated countries, service regulation becomes negatively related with industry
growth, agreeing with Barone and Cingano (2011). This results indicates that it might exist a
threshold that after some level of deregulation, regulations do not matter.
Results are reported in Table 7 without including in the sample the most five deregulated
countries in 1999, and service regulation becomes significant in all cases. The only difference is
that financial development has no effect on industry growth for that period. This results provide
evidence that important changes in service regulation might affect the economic performance
of a country, if the period of time is large enough to let countries take action and change their
regulations it will possible have effects on industry growth, specifically those industries which
depend more in the service whose regulation has been changed. Holding beginning-of-period
regulation constant, value added growth in service intensive industries benefits form higher
deregulation.
The industry with overall service dependence for this period at the 75th is manufacturing
and recycling, whereas the industry situated at the 25th is other non-metallic mineral products,
which in the previous period was an industry situated at the 75th, which means it has experienced
a huge deregulation process between this period. The coefficient estimated in column 1 implies
this differential would rise by approximately 0.45 percentage points if regulation were to be
2See Appendix A.3
3Denmark, Australia, Sweden, Finland, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Ireland, Mexico and Netherlands.
4Denmark, Australia, Sweden, Poland and United Kingdom.
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consistently lowered in the four services by an amount equal to the difference in average between
a country at the 75th and a country at the 25th.
Table 7: Service Regulation and Growth 1999-2007















Service regulation [SERV REGi,c] -0.085* -0.097** -0.032* -0.496** -0.197*
(0.046) (0.049) (0.077) (0.248) (0.136)
Financial dev. x external dep. [FDc x EDc] 0.002 0.010 0.002
(0.004) (0.013) (0.004)
Accounting stand. x external dep [ACCSTANc x EDc] 0.013
(0.010)
Change in service regulation [DSERV REGi,c] 0.134
(0.191)
Initial industry share [SHAREi,c] 0.272*** 0.244*** 0.317*** 0.247***
(0.074) (0.078) (0.094) (0.084)
Constant -0.042 -0.032 0.184 0.068 -0.019
(0.028) (0.031) (0.034) (0.039) (0.035)
Observations 203 138 154 124 138
R2 0.72 0.77 0.67 0.66 0.77
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Results are calculated without including Denmark, Australia, Sweden, Finland and United Kingdom.
Dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate of real value added at country-industry level [GROWTHi,c].
Financial development is calculated as private credit by deposit money banks over GDP in 1999 [FDc] in column 3
and as accounting standards in 1983 [ACCSTANc] in column 4. Service regulation is measured in 1999 except for
column 5 that is the average value. DSERV REGi,c measures exposure to service deregulation, the change in
regulation between 1999 and 2007.
If we investigate the relationship between service regulation, industry prices and nominal
growth, we find different results for the effects of service regulation on industry prices. Table
8 presents the results for financial development, prices and nominal growth between 1999 and
2007. Unlike the findings in the first part, service regulation has no effects over prices, although,
similarly with the first part it has no effects over nominal growth. Nominal growth is an in-
teraction between real value added growth and prices, none of them are significant (including
all countries in the sample) for this period, as a result service regulation has no effect over
nominal growth. However, if we drop the most five deregulated countries, as before, there is a
positive effect over prices but an insignificant effect over industry nominal growth, which are the
same results as Barone and Cingano (2011). Because the negative effects of service regulation
over real value added growth compensates with the positive relationship between higher service
regulation and prices.
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Table 8: Financial Development, Prices and Nominal Growth 1999-2007










Service regulation [SERV REGi,c] 0.033 0.037 -0.017 -0.027
(-0.170) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Financial dev. x external dep. [FDc x EDc] -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.066) (0.002)
Initial industry share [SHAREi,c] 0.073 0.064 0.060
(0.059) (0.066) (0.067)
Constant 0.015 0.160 0.024 0.036*** 0.034***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.055) (0.057)
Observations 256 189 261 193 193
R2 0.60 0.62 0.79 0.80 0.80
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
In columns 1-2 the dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate of value added implicit deflator
at industry-country level. In columns 3-5 the dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate
of nominal value added at industry-country.
Financial development is calculated as private credit by deposit money banks over GDP in 1996 [FDc] and
as accounting standards in 1983 [ACCSTANc]. Service regulation is measured in 1996.DSERV REGi,c
measures exposure to service deregulation, the change in regulation between 1999 and 2007.
5.3 Domestic and Foreign Service Regulation and Growth
The scope for growth of trade in services is vast, a primarily reason of why international trade
in services has been limited is because the need of physical contact between producers and con-
sumers. New technology, in particular, telecommunications provide a medium of exchange that
overcomes such an historical limitation; science advances in information and communication
technologies are increasingly permitting cross-border trade in labor intensive services, acceler-
ating the growth of services activities. Foreign suppliers are sources of new technologies as well
as the competition that is needed in markets. Because of the increasing importance of interna-
tional trade in manufacturing and offshoring of services, it is important to study how foreign
regulations affect domestic industry growth, and to examine weather domestic regulation is more
influential than foreign regulation or the other way around.
In the first part of this section, instead of following the same procedure as Barone and
Cingano (2011), who assumed US input-output accounts reflect technological differences rather
than country-specific determinants, not allowing for the possibility that using input-output
weights from a benchmark country, does not allow to correctly measure technological dependence
on service inputs because country-specific weights are different. Because of that, in order to
construct the domestic DSERV REGi,c I use each country particular input-output account
with each country specific service regulation policy. The time period studied in this part is the
same as in the first part of the analysis, 1996-2002 and all the other variables are also the same
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as in Table 4. The regression is the following:
GROWTHi,c = α+ βWSERV REGi,c + δSHAREi,c + µi + γc + εi,c
Where WSERV REGi,c accounts for industry i dependence on service regulation in country
c, calculating service dependence using each country input-output matrices and service regula-
tion policies.
Coefficient 1 of Table 9 presents the direct weights obtained from the technical coefficients of
each country specific input-output accounts, calculated as the ratio of expenditures on service
out of the value of industry output. It can be observed, that an increase in service regulation
leads to a decrease in industry growth. The introduction of financial development, private credit
by deposit money bank in column 3 and accounting standards in column 4, does not change
the effects of service regulation over industry growth, furthermore both measures of financial
development are highly significant. Measuring service dependence taking into account each own
country input-output accounts and service regulation leads to the same results as Barone and
Cingano (2011), using US input-output accounts as benchmark appears to work fine when using
domestic service dependence.











Own Service Regulation [WSERV REGi,c] -0.002** -0.002** -0.003**
(0.001) (.001) (0.001)
Finanical dev. x external dev. [FDc x EDc] 0.004*
(0.002)
Accounting stand. x external dep. [ACCSTANc x EDc] 0.021***
(0.006)
Initial industry share [SHAREi,c] 0.164*** 0.146*** 0.161***
(0.058) (0.055) (0.058)
Constant 0.010 0.011 -0.034
(0.010) (0.028) (0.011)
Observations 187 187 187
R2 0.70 0.70 0.71
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate of real value added at country-industry level [GROWTHi,c].
Financial development is calculated as private credit by deposit money banks over GDP in 1996 [FDc] in column 2
and as accounting standards in 1983 [ACCSTANc] in column 3.
Service regulation is measured in 1996.
For getting a sense of the size of this effect, percentiles take into account the annual growth
differential between and industry with overall service dependence at the 75th (Pulp, paper, paper
products, printing and publishing) in comparison with an industry at the 25th (Food products,
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beverages and tobacco) percentile. The coefficient estimated in column 1 implies this differential
would rise by approximately 0.60 percentage points if regulation were to be uniformly lowered
in the four services by an amount equal to the difference in average between a country at the
75th (Belgium and Italy) in comparison with a country at the 25th (Great Britain).
Once observed that each country specific weights and service regulations have effects over
industry growth, I will consider, in this part, services that countries use from other countries,
the idea behind this analysis is that there is an increasing trade of service across countries, and
each country uses services from other countries which are under the policy regulation of that
country. Because of that, it is more appropriate to use the world input-output tables to take
into account the service dependence each country has form other countries, as well as their own
service dependence. The regression is the following:
GROWTHi,c,sc′ = α+ β0WSERV REGi,c + β1FSERV REGi,c,sc′ + δSHAREi,c +µi + γc + εi,c
Where WSERV REGi, c presents service dependence on industry i in country c over service
regulation, accounts for the domestic industry dependence on service regulation each country
has on its own country, computed using each country input-output accounts obtained from the
OECD input-output database. While FSERV REGi,c,sc′ corresponds to industry i dependence
on service regulation in country c and usage of services-in-country c’, it accounts for the industry
dependence on services each country has from other countries, as every country uses services
from other countries, it is computed using the input-output accounts and taking into account
foreign service regulation policy.
Table 10 presents the strongest results of the paper. Service regulation is highly significant
at 1% level in all the cases. The positive coefficient of domestic service regulation contrast
with the negative coefficient of foreign service regulation. One possible explanation might be
that foreign service regulation has more influence on the economic performance of downstream
industries than domestic regulations. Moreover, the results remain the same when controlling
for both measures of finance dependence (private credit by deposit money banks and accounting
standards for columns 2 and 3 respectively). Finally, correlations between domestic and foreign
service regulation are very high.5
5See Appendix A.4
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Including foreign and domestic regulation implies that assuming US input-output table as
a measure of service dependence for every country does not hold anymore. Domestic service
regulation has a positive effect over industry growth, whereas increasing foreign service regulation
decreases industry growth in downstream manufacturing industries who use regulated services
more intensively.











Own Service Regulation [WSERV REGi, c] 0.039*** -0.039*** -0.036**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Foreign Service Regulation [FSERV REGi,c] -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Finanical dev. x external dev. [FDc x EDc] 0.004*
(0.002)
Accounting stand. x external dep. [ACCSTANc X EDc] 0.021***
(0.006)
Initial industry share [SHAREi,c] 0.143** 0.126*** 0.161***
(0.056) (0.053) (0.058)
Constant 0.014 0.015 -0.034
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Observations 187 187 187
R2 0.72 0.70 0.73
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate of real value added at country-industry level [GROWTHi,c].
Financial development is calculated as private credit by deposit money banks over GDP in 1996 [FDc] in column 2
and as accounting standards in 1983 [ACCSTANc] in column 3.
Service regulation is measured in 1996.
Nevertheless this finding is a preliminary study, research has to be done in more detail, in
order to elaborate a theoretical framework explaining the theoretical background under this
result.
6 Conclusions
As part of the Single Market Program the European Commission commanded the liberalization
and regulatory harmonization of utilities, transport and telecommunication services. In this
study I have examined the impact of service deregulation (professional services, telecommuni-
cations, transport and energy) on industry growth between 1996 and 2002, finding that service
regulation has a negative and significant impact on industry value added growth rate of service
dependent industries, which leads to the same conclusions that Barone and Cingano (2011)
found. Although service regulation has shown to change between 1999 and 2007, specially due
to the high volatility of professional services, which leads to different results for this period of
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time.
This study focuses on the effects of product market regulations on one of the key components
of the output gap across countries: economic growth, as the process of economic convergence,
observed for some decades has stopped and even partially reversed, this study contributes in
explaining how this divergence across countries is affected by service regulation policies.
Because of the increasing international trade in services, this study considers service regula-
tion impacts on industry growth, taking into account service usage of other countries services.
The preliminary results show that countries are more sensitive to foreign service dependence
and regulation than to its own service dependence and regulation, domestic service regulation
has a positive and significant impact on industry growth, although foreign service regulation has
a negative and significant effect, because of that computing service dependence using a bench-
mark country appears not to hold anymore. This results are an important finding, however,
they leave important questions open for future research, in order to examine deeper how both
types of service dependence and regulation (domestic and foreign) behave.
Finally, overall the regulation-growth linkage seems to be robust to different model specifi-
cations and sample periods coverage within the OECD countries, although, there is scope for
further investigation as more analysis can be done, for example, it might be interesting studying
if the effects that service regulation have over growth are the same for non-OECD countries,




• Country Sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Check Republic, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Germany (west), Greece, Hungry, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slo-
vak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. Although
not all the countries are used in the analysis. 6
• Industry Sample: According to the Isic. Rev 3 classification. ”Food products, beverages
and tobacco (15-16), ”Textiles and textile products” (17-18), ”Leather, leather products
and footwear” (19), ”Wood and products of wood and cork” (20), ”Pulp, paper, paper
products, printing and publishing” (21-22), ”Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear
fuel” (23), ”Chemicals and chemical products” (24), ”Rubber and plastics products” (25),
”Other non-metallic mineral products” (26), ”Basic metals” (27), ”Fabricated metal prod-
ucts, except machinery and equipment” (28), ”Machinery and equipment, (29)”, ”Electri-
cal and optical equipment” (30-33), ”Transport equipment” (34-35) and ”Manufacturing
N.E.C, recycling” (36-37).
• Policy Sample: Policy variables are calculated as indexes on a scale from 0 to 6, where
6 represent the stricter conditions:
– Energy: Entry barriers and vertical integration in electricity and gas. (The indicator
covers production, transmission and supply).
– Telecommunications: Entry for post and telecommunications. (The indicators cover
basic letter, parcel and courier services and trunk and long distance fixed telephony
and mobile telephony respectively).
– Transport: Entry for airlines, entry and vertical integration for rail and entry for
road. (The indicators cover passenger service, passenger and freight services and
freight services respectively).
– Professional Services: Entry (licensing, education requirements and quotas and eco-
nomic needs test) and conduct regulation (prices and fees, advertising form of business
6Check Republic, West Germany, Hungry, Ireland, Iceland, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Slovak
Republic and United States are not included in the regressions, either for lack of data or for collinearity problems.
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and inter-professional cooperation). The indicator covers engineering, legal, account-
ing and architectural professions.
• Input-Output Tables: In order to pair country-level information on service regulation
and industry-level data on service dependence, the sectors we handle according to the
Isic. Rev 3, are the following: ”Post and telecommunications” (64), ”Electricity, gas and
water” (40-41), ”Transport and storage” (60-63) and ”Renting of M&E and other business
services” (71-74).
A.2 Variable Definition
• NGROWTHi,c: Annual compounded growth rate of nominal value added for 1996-2002
and 1999-2007 for industry i and country c. (Value added at current prices).
• GROWTHi,c: Annual compounded growth rate of real value added for 1996-2002 and 1999-
2007 for industry i in country c. (Value added at current prices / value added deflators).
• DEFGROWTHi,c: Annual compounded growth rate of value added implicit deflator for
1996-2007 for industry i in country c. (Value added deflators).
• SHAREi,c: Share of industry i in total value added in manufacturing in country c for 1996
and 1999. (Value added at current prices in 1996 and 1999 in industry i / total value
added in country c in 1996 and 1999 respectively).
Source: OECD STAN databse (ISIC Rev. 3, SNA93).
• Wenergyi,s: Industry i dependence on energy. Matched with 40-41 (electricity, gas and
water supply) in input-output accounts.
• Wtelecommunicationi,s: Industry i dependence on telecommunications. Matched with 64
(post and telecommunications) in input-output accounts.
• Wtransportsi,s: Industry i dependence on transport. Matched with 60-63 (transport and
storage) in input-output accounts.
• Wprof. servicesi,s: Industry i dependence on professional services. Matched with 71-74
(renting of machinery and equipment, computer and related activities, R&D and other
business activities).
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Source: OECD Input-Output accounts for 1997 and average 1999-2007. WIOD Input-Output
accounts for the average between 1996-2002.
• Energy regulationc,s: Regulation of energy in country c, including electricity and gas.
Accounting for entry barriers and the degree of vertical integration.
• Telecommunication regulationc,s: Regulation of telecommunication in country c, including
post and telecommunications. Accounting for entry barriers.
• Transport regulationc,s: Transport regulation in country c, including rail, air and road.
Accounting for entry barriers in air, rail and road, and on vertical integration in rail.
• Professional services regulationc,s: Professional services regulation in country c, includ-
ing legal, accounting, engineers and architects. Accounting for entry barriers and the
regulation of market conduct.
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) in 1996 and 1999.
• FDc: Financial development in each country c measured as private credit by deposit money
banks over GDP in 1996 and 1999.
Source: World Bank’s financial development and structure database.
• EDi: Industry i dependence on external finance, defined as capital expenditure minus
internal funds.
Source: Thomson Financial Worldscope database.
• BCSERVREGi,c: Barone and Cingano (2011) index of exposure of each manufacturing
industry in four service sectors (energy, telecommunication, transport and professional
services). It is computed as,
∑
s(wi,sXi,s) where wi,s is the industry i dependence on each
service and Xi,s is the regulation of each service in each country c.
• DSERVREG: Difference between SERVREG in 1996 ans SERVREG in 2002. (SERV REG1996−
SERV REG2002). And difference between SERVREG in 1999 and 2007. (SERV REG1999−
SERV REG2007)
• Average SERVREG: Average SERVREG between 1996 and 2002, and average SERVREG
between 1999 and 2007.
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Source: OECD Product Market Regulation and US 1997 OECD input-output account.
• WSERVREGi,c: Barone and Cingano (2011) index of exposure of each manufacturing
industry in four service sectors (energy, telecommunication, transport and professional
services). It is computed as,
∑
s(wi,sXi,s) where wi,s is the domestic industry i dependence
on each service and Xi,s is the regulation of each service in each country c.
• FSERVREGi,c,sc’: Index of exposure of each manufacturing industry i in four service sec-
tors (energy, telecommunication, transport and professional services). It is computed as,∑
s(wi,c,sc′Xc,sc′) where wi,c,sc′ is the industry i in country c of using services c’ and Xc,sc′
is the regulation of service s in country c and c’.
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation and World Input Output Databse (WIOD).
26
A.3 Difference between professional service regulations from Conway and
Nicoletti (2006)
Figure 1: Differences between professional service regulation, computed as 90% confidence intervals, in
1998 and 2003.
A.4 Domestic and Foreign summary statistics and correlations
Table 11: Summary statistics and correlations
Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Corr.
Domestic energy 322 1.650 8.940 0 139.763 0.964***
Foreign energy 350 0.049 0.196 0 2.059
Domestic telecommunications 336 0.231 1.277 0 18.462 0.943***
Foreign telecommunications 350 0.017 0.093 0 1.241
Domestic transports 336 2.347 16.107 0 267.181 0.995***
Foreign transports 350 0.322 1.690 0 20.132
Domestic professional services 252 12.152 56.136 0 544.925 0.998***
Foreign professional services 350 0.538 2.587 0 27.265
Domestic SERVREG 238 8.494 48.422 0 662.321 0.994***
Foreign SERVREG 350 0.927 4.476 0 49.062
Notes: Summary statistics and correlations of foreign and domestic regulations.
Correlations are calculated as the correlation between the viable and the variable below
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